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The Irony of Health Care’s Public Option
Allison K. Hoffman
University of Pennsylvania Law School
I.

Introduction

As the 2020 Democratic primaries heated up in September 2019, the Center for
Deliberative Democracy gathered 523 voters, designed to be a representative sample of the
electorate, in a room in Dallas, Texas for three days for an experiment called “America in One
Room.”1 Researchers pre-polled the participants for their views on a range of controversial
political issues, from immigration to the environment to health care. Then, over the weekend,
these 523 “citizen delegates” immersed in conversation in small groups and plenary sessions
and with field experts and candidates on these topics. At the end, they were asked their views
again. On some topics their views changed wildly from beginning to end. One where it did not
was health care’s public option. At the beginning, just over 67 percent favored the idea that
“[e]veryone should be able to buy a public plan like Medicare,” and at the end just over 71
percent did. With asked the same idea with respect to people age 55 or older, the idea was
even more popular: 72 percent at the start and 78.5 percent at the end. 2 People love the idea
of a public health insurance option.
Yet, this idea might be more popular that warranted. At least a half century old, it has
never had its day in the limelight. This chapter explains why if that moment ever comes, the
public option will fall short of expectations that it will provide a differentiated, meaningful
alternative and will spur health insurance competition.
Health care’s public option bubbled up in its best-known form in California in the early
2000s and got increasing mainstream attention in the lead up to the 2010 health reform, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).3 Although it was not adopted into the ACA,
the idea has reemerged with vigor once again as a cure to ACA shortcomings.
When people talk about health care’s public option, they mean a public health
insurance plan, typically based on Medicare, that can compete in the market against private
health insurance offerings. In their book, The Public Option, Ganesh Sitaraman and Anne Alstott
refer to this type as a competitive public option, which they describe as having two key
characteristics: that this option, first, “guarantees access to important services at a controlled

1

Center for Deliberative Democracy, America in One Room (2019), at
https://cdd.stanford.edu/2019/america-in-one-room/.
2
Center for Deliberative Democracy, A1R Results (2020), at https://cdd.stanford.edu/mm/2019/10/A1RResults-Participants-Overall-Issues-Scale-Collapsed-Oct2.pdf
3
Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117
(2010).
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price” and, second, coexists with private provision.4 In this vein, proponents have argued that a
public health insurance option could deliver better cost-control than private insurance, while
also being able to offer members a broad choice of providers and quality control. 5
Health care’s public option died in the 2010 legislative process, but had it been enacted,
it would have faced serious obstacles to produce the results its architects hoped. The
assumption that people will select the public option if it is better than other options is belied by
mounting body of empirical literature showing how we struggle when choosing among health
insurance options. Even more, political thorniness would almost certainly have prevented the
public option from being a clear best alternative, which would have further impeded its ability
to stand out in the crowd and to move the needle on the price and quality.
This chapter argues that for a public health insurance option to have the kind of
transformative potential that Sitaraman and Alstott hope for from public options--to promote
greater health equity and freedom--it needs to be more than an option among many, a
competitive public option. It must be designed in a way that does not rely on people weighting
it against other options available and selecting it over the competition when it is the best.
This chapter examines possibilities for health care’s public option in three parts. It first
explains the theory behind the ACA version of a competitive public option. It then considers the
challenges this competitive public option would have faced had it become policy reality. Finally,
it examines more effective ways that public health insurance might be integrated into a
public/private hybrid system to achieve greater health equity.
II.

The “Classic” Health Care Public Option
A. The History

To understand why the public option emerged, and why it has struggled to gain traction,
it is helpful to recount the development of health insurance in the United States. This well-worn
story is worth revisiting because it is still salient.
The United States is unique among OECD nations when it comes to paying for health
care, and not in a good way. Most countries’ systems for health care financing grew up in the
early- to mid-20th century as medical care became more advanced and more expensive than
most people could afford on their own.6 In Europe, what emerged were public systems of
health care finance in two forms, often characterized broadly as Beveridge and Bismarckian

4

GANESH SITARAMAN & ANNE L. ALSTOTT, THE PUBLIC OPTION 27 (2019). They explain: “Citizens can rely on the
public option but also can turn to the marketplace for additional choices, combining public and private options in
ways that work best for them.” Id. at 23.
5
JACOB S. HACKER, INSTITUTE FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM 3
(2008).
6
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE __ (1982).
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systems.7 The Beveridge approach was direct provision of health care by the government, as in
England, where the government owns hospitals and employs medical professionals—aka
“socialized medicine.” Bismarckian systems, or social insurance, are ones where the
government finances health care but the providers can be public or private. Over time,
countries in Europe and beyond, such as Canada, developed variations on these themes. At the
core, however, these systems embraced the basic idea that the government would take a
central role in ensuring access to affordable health care for the entire population.
The U.S. charted a wholly different path. The beginning upsurge of health insurance in
the United States was initiated by industry itself. As medical care became both more effective
and expensive, people increasingly sought it. Hospitals feared not being paid for their work if
they relied on patients to pay cash for services, nor did they want to have to confirm the
financial solvency of every patient prior to caring for them. 8 Hospitals thus created pre-paid
health care funds, beginning with Baylor University Hospital in the 1920s, that guaranteed
people access to medical care up to a certain level, with pre-payment. 9 These plans spread and
eventually took on the name Blue Cross. Within a short period, Blue Shield followed, offering a
similar a structure for monthly prepayment of fees to groups of physicians in turn for
guaranteed access of outpatient care. Unlike the health insurance of today, the Blues embraced
some of the solidaristic characteristics that define systems elsewhere in the world, like charging
all members of a community the same rate for membership regardless of their personal
characteristics or health status.
A second—and the most defining—major development in U.S. was the rise of employersponsored health insurance (ESI) during and after World War II. Increased reliance on
employers as a source of health coverage in the U.S. coincided with the moment that many
other countries were doubling down on the government’s role. In England, for example, during
WWII the government built health infrastructure to deal with an unmet need for medical
services and this infrastructure served as the beginning of the National Health Service,
established at the end of the war.10
In the U.S., in contrast, in the years during and especially after WWII, ESI surged,
bolstered by several public policies. A commonly-told story is that the trend began with wage
freezes during the war prompting employers to compensate with benefits instead of cash
wages, but the growth in these plans was relatively small in this period.11 More consistent with
the timing of a major upsurge in adoption of ESI were a 1945 federal rule that required
employers to leave wartime health benefits in place, a 1949 federal rule allowing unions to
bargain for health benefits, and most importantly a 1954 rule by the Internal Revenue Service
7

Id. at __.
Id. at __
9
Id. at __
10
Donald W. Light, Universal Health Care: Lessons From the British Experience, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 25, 26
8

(2003).

11

David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications,
355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 82, 83 (2006).
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excluding dollars spent on health benefits by employers and employees from taxes. 12 This
meant, by one estimate, that a dollar of compensation in cash wages only cost employers an
average of $.66 if spent on health benefits. With all of these factors, ESI and the centrality of
private insurance took hold. Today, half of all Americans have insurance through an employer. 13
Public financing however maintained a key role. It began in small scale in the Veterans
Health Administration and Indian Health Services. In 1965, after decades of attempts at
universal, public health coverage, Medicare and Medicaid were signed into law by President
Johnson. These programs established public programs to pay for medical care for populations
seen as vulnerable and also least likely to have access to ESI—the elderly (Medicare) and poor
children, pregnant women, and people with disabilities (Medicaid).
People who didn’t qualify for a form of public coverage and who didn’t have private
coverage available through an employer had limited options.14 Some people could access
charity care. Others paid out-of-pocket for health care, although doing so for anything other
than the simplest care was out of the reach of most people. A final pathway was to buy health
insurance directly from an insurer in the individual, or nongroup, insurance market, and doing
so was thorny. In the individual market, insurers underwrote applicants and deemed many
people with prior health problems as risky. Six to seven percent of the non-elderly population
(about 15 million people) had individual-market coverage prior to the passage of the ACA. 15
Historically, this coverage was relatively more expensive, in part because administrative costs
were as high as 15-20 percent of total costs. Individuals deemed risky were declined coverage. 16
As many as three in five people who applied for policies before the ACA could not afford the
high premium prices or were denied coverage, and many people remained uninsured or
underinsured. 17
B. The ACA and the Individual Insurance Market

12

Id. at 83.
Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (2017),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
14
Timothy S. Jost, Access to Health Insurance and Health Benefits, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. HEALTH LAW
PG (I. Glenn Cohen, Allison K. Hoffman, and William Sage, eds. 2017).
15
Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis of the March
2009 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF No. 334, Sept. 2009, at 5.
16
See, e.g., Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and
Prospects for Change, HEALTH AFF. 79, 81 (2004); SARA R. COLLINS ET. AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, SQUEEZED: WHY
RISING EXPOSURE TO HEALTH CARE COSTS THREATENS THE HEALTH AND FINANCIAL WELL-BEING OF AMERICAN FAMILIES 3-4 (2006).
17
Michelle M. Doty et al., Failure to Protect: Why the Individual Insurance Market Is Not a Viable Option
for Most U.S. Families, COMMONWEALTH FUND PUB. no. 1300, 2009, at 1-3.
13
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In the year before the ACA’s passage, 16.3% of Americans were uninsured, including
18.4% of people under age 65, and many more were underinsured.18 The goal of the ACA was
to fill in the gaps between public coverage and ESI through two primary mechanisms: expansion
of the Medicaid program to more poor Americans and regulation of the individual market to
make it a source of affordable and meaningful coverage for everyone else without ESI or public
coverage.
Here is where the public option came into play.
The ACA’s strategy relied heavily on getting more people enrolled in private health
insurance, for reasons both political and pragmatic.19 Yet, the individual market was
inhospitable to the goals of universal access and affordability, and early architects of the
Obama reform had two responses to discipline the private insurance companies in this market:
(1) regulate them and (2) create competition through a public option.
The first required a federalization of heath regulation and a complicated, multipronged
approach. Prior to the ACA, most health insurance regulation, especially of the individual
market, occurred at the state level, and there was little of it. 20 The ACA created federal rules for
individual insurance, drawing lessons from the 2006 health reform in Massachusetts. Insurers
were required to issue insurance to any applicant (“guaranteed issue”).21 Medical underwriting
was prohibited, and insurers could not consider pre-existing conditions in determining eligibility
or price.22 In fact, premiums for a policy were allowed to vary based on only four factors: age,
geography, family size, and tobacco use status.23 Even if an insurer devised a way to cherry-pick
out healthier applicants, the law intended to disgorge any resulting profits through reinsurance

18

DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, OVERVIEW OF THE
UNINSURED IN THE UNITED STATES: A SUMMARY OF THE 2011 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (2011),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/2011/cpshealthins2011/ib.shtml.
19
Politically many believed no law would have passed without the support of—or at least without active
opposition from—the insurance industry. During the Clinton reform efforts, a coalition of health insurers, under
the name Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA), financed negative advertising campaigns that hampered
reform. JACOB S. HACKER, THE ROAD TO NOWHERE: THE GENESIS OF PRESIDENT CLINTON’S PLAN FOR HEALTH SECURITY 145-46
(1997). (The HIAA is now part of the group called America’s Health Insurance Plans). How large of a negative
impact these ads had is debated. See Paul Starr, What Happened to Health Care Reform? 20 AMERICAN PROSPECT 20
(1994). In one now iconic advertisement, a couple named Harry and Louise lament that reform would result in few
insurance choices and increased prices. Coalition for Health Insurance Choices, Harry and Louis on Clinton’s Health
Plan, YOUTUBE (1994), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dt31nhleeCg .
20
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(2012)).Only six states required that insurers guarantee issue policies to all applicants, and only one-third of states
regulated the variability in premium prices allowed among insured. Individual Market Guaranteed Issue (Not
Applicable to HIPAA Eligible Individuals), KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/individualmarket-guaranteed-issue-not-applicable-to-hipaa-eligible-individuals/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2019).
21
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012).
22
Id.
23
Id.
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and risk-adjustment arrangements.24 And the ACA also regulated benefits, requiring that all
plans cover preventative care without cost sharing and a set of essential health benefits for
individual-market plans, and prohibited limits on these benefits for most plans. 25
So that these regulations did not exacerbate adverse selection, or the tendency of
healthier people to wait to buy coverage until they need it, the law included an individual
mandate that required that most Americans carry health insurance that offers “minimum
essential coverage,” or else pay a penalty.26 As a carrot, the ACA provided for financial support
to help lower-income individuals. Anyone who earns from 100 to 400% of the federal poverty
level ($12,490 to $49,960 for a single person in 2020) and does not have another source of
adequate insurance, such as through an employer or Medicaid, is eligible for subsidized
premiums and in many cases also cost-sharing reductions to help pay for their out-of-pocket
share of costs.27
C. The ACA’s (Foregone) Public Option
In case the nearly 200 pages of the ACA devoted to the endeavor of regulating private
insurance to achieve broader policy goals fell short, there was a second strategy: create
competition through a public option.
The idea was to develop a public health plan, based either loosely or very closely on
Medicare, that would compete with private health plans in the exchanges—new marketplaces
where people would go to compare and buy health insurance policies. The public option was
described by its proponents as simply one option among many, a public health insurance plan
that would compete side-by-side with private plans and would win if the private options were
not good enough. Presumably, if the public option offered a similar or better product for lower
prices, people would choose it. As Jacob Hacker suggested: “public plan choice gives Americans
the opportunity to choose for themselves how they value the strengths and weaknesses of a
public, Medicare-like plan and competing private health plans.”28
24

Id. at § 1341-42, 42 U.S.C. § 18061-62 (2012). These provisions of the ACA are not working as smoothly
as envisioned in early years of implementation because the contributions from insurers intended to cover these
payments have fallen well short of the amount CMS owes insurers in claims. Timothy Jost, Risk Corridor Claims by
Insurers Far Exceed Contributions, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/01/implementing-health-reform-risk-corridor-claims-by-insurers-farexceed-contributions/.
25
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302, 42 U.S.C. § 18022; Id. at § 1001, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11
(2012), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012).
26
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). Some people are
exempted from the penalty for reasons including religious objection or affordability, defined as when premiums
cost over eight percent of household income. Id.
27
Id. at § 1401, 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2012) (providing for “premium tax credits”); Id. at § 1402, 42 U.S.C §
18071 (2012) (providing for “cost-sharing reductions”). The employer plan must be “adequate” and “affordable.”
Adequate is defined as an actuarial value of at least 60% and affordable is when the employee’s share of premium
cost is under 9.5% of her income.
28
Hacker, supra note 4, at 2.
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But this idea faced staunch resistance. Even advocates of market-based policy fought
back, both on the details and on the concept as a whole. The public option was cast aside. Yet
imagine for a moment that Congress had included a public option as part of the ACA. Would the
world look different than it does today, and how?
III.

Envisioning an Alternate Future: the ACA with the Public Option

Had the public option survived the policy battles leading up to the passage of the ACA
and become law, it would still have faced an uphill journey to fulfill the potential that Sitaraman
and Alstott see in competitive public options (offering quality access at controlled prices and
co-existing with private alternatives). There were two main possible ways health care’s public
option could have played out, and neither pathway would have fulfilled this vision; each would
have fulfilled exactly one-half of it.
A. The Two Pathways for a Public Option
The first pathway would have led to everyone enrolling in the public option—what
Jacob Hacker describes in his chapter as a back door to universal Medicare (Pathway 1). In
Pathway 1, the public option would be based on Medicare. It would borrow Medicare’s existing
provider network and negotiated rates. This is the version its architects envisioned. Since the
plans sold on the ACA’s exchanges are standardized by regulation—they vary little on benefits
and cost sharing structure—the way plans distinguish themselves is based on network, pricing,
or perhaps name recognition or brand.
If the public option were built on Medicare’s platform, it would easily have bettered
private options on these dimensions in most geographies. Medicare has an extensive network
of providers, who accept lower rates from Medicare than they do from private insurance, which
pays rates to hospitals that are sometimes 50 percent higher than what Medicare pays. 29
Medicare also controls spending growth better than private plans.30 The divergence between
what Medicare and private insurers pay is increasing as consolidation among hospitals and
other providers has enabled providers to demand significant rate increases from private
plans.31 Plus, Medicare’s administrative rates are lower than those for private insurance, even
considering that private insurance administrative rates for the individual market are limited
under the ACA. All of this means that even if a public option plan paid providers a cut above
Medicare’s standard negotiated rates, it could offer similar benefits at much lower premium
prices than private plans with a more comprehensive network of providers. It would simply be
the better option.

29

MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 14-15 (March 2018).
Id.
31
Id.
30
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Assuming people understood that the public option was clearly better—an assumption
that should be taken with a grain of salt for reasons described below—everyone would have
chosen the cheaper, better public option. Even if people chose only based on premium price,
which evidence suggests is exactly what often happens on the ACA exchanges, 32 the public
option would have won out. Over time, it would have displaced the private plans altogether
and become the de facto coverage for anyone seeking a health plan on an ACA exchanges.
Pathway 1 would thus deliver on one half of the competitive public option vision. It
would have provided guaranteed access at controlled prices, but eventually would not have
coexisted with private plans at all, at least not side-by-side in a competitive structure.
Interest groups who opposed the public option—including insurers and medical
providers and suppliers (pharmaceutical and medical device companies) whose reimbursement
would be lower under Pathway 1—saw the writing on the wall. During the ACA debates, they
answered the mention of a public insurance plan option with cries of socialism. 33 They also
demanded that if a public option were passed it had to compete without relying on the
preexisting advantages of Medicare over private insurance.
The second possible way the public option could have, and likely would have, played out
in the current political environment would have been that these interest groups’ demands won
out (Pathway 2). Imagine that a public option had to compete on “even ground,” or “break
even financially” (the latter of which even President Obama asserted 34). Although it’s difficult to
know exactly what that would have meant in practice, at the very least it would have prohibited
the public option from coasting on the pre-existing Medicare network and negotiated prices. If
the public option did not have a clear pricing or network advantage—if it were not a clear
winner—what would that have meant?
B. The Problem of Choice
In some of the examples that Sitaraman and Alstott profile in The Public Option,
competitive public options are effective because they offer a genuinely meaningful alternative.
Sometimes this alternative is one that is less expensive, or even free, as compared to pricier
and probably fancier and more exclusive private options. This is the case with public pools—the
inspiration for the cover of the print version of the book. Sometimes the alternative is part of a
tiered system. With the USPS, they suggest, one can get reliable standard mail services, but for
higher-end packing and shipping needs, Fed-Ex and UPS are the better go-to option.

32

AVALERE HEALTH, MORE THAN 2 MILLION EXCHANGE ENROLLEES FORGO COST-SHARING ASSISTANCE (Aug. 19, 2015),
http://avalere.com/expertise/managed-care/insights/more-than-2-million-exchange-enrollees-forgo-cost-sharingassistance [https://perma.cc/22M2-6C23].
33
Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Reform Happened, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 861, 864
(2010).
34
Michael O’Brien, Steele: Public Option is Socialism, THE HILL (Aug. 9, 2009),
https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/57825-steele-public-option-is-socialism.
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The problem with health care’s competitive public option is that in its more politically
realistic form (Pathway 2), it would not have been easily differentiated in this way, and end
users would have struggled to see its relative benefit. The public option would have offered
nearly the same benefits as the private options, likely at a similar price. It might have been
marginally better under close examination—maybe a better network of providers, maybe some
extra benefits because of the ability of these plans to operate more slimly, maybe less
administrative hassle for enrollees (or perhaps not), or maybe it would have provided an easier
transition to Medicare once eligible. But none of these attributes would have been easy to
detect, nor would they likely have driven someone’s health plan selection.
The main problem, thus, with any politically-realistic version of a competitive public
option in health care is the problem of choice. Consumers are notoriously bad at deciphering
differences among health plans and choosing wisely among them. This should be unsurprising
when considering the nature of health plan choice. Fundamentally, buying health insurance
demands having preferences about things that most people have never experienced before,
like hospitalization or cancer care. Then they have to weigh this risk against spending on other
goods and services.
Then someone must understand how such preferences translate into health insurance
policy terms. Most people do not understand the basic features of health insurance plans that
should shape their decisions—such as how much a plan costs and what benefits are covered. 35
In a survey of insured adults, only 14 percent correctly answered four simple multiple-choice
questions about cost-sharing features, such as a deductible or copayment.36 However, people
overestimated their understanding of these insurance concepts, which suggests many would
not seek help or education even if available.

35

Deborah W. Garnick et al., How Well Do Americans Understand their Health Coverage, 12 HEALTH AFF.
204, 206 (1993) (finding that even though consumers largely understood whether their plans covered
hospitalization or doctors’ visits, they underreported that their plans covered services including mental health,
alcohol and drug abuse treatment, or prescription drug and over-reported that their plans covered long-term
care).
36
George Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insurance,32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850,
855 (2013).
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Furthermore, choosing a health plan requires making calculations regarding deductibles,
cost-sharing, and premiums that exceed many American’s literacy and numeracy skills. 37 Even
college educated people show surprisingly high levels of error on simple arithmetic tests. 38
Even putting aside these challenges, choosing health insurance has all of the telltale
characteristics that impair rational decisionmaking, sometimes referred to as generating
cognitive biases. People are overly optimistic about their own health, 39 which could prompt
them to underinvest in health insurance. People also struggle to factor risk into decisionmaking—an element central, of course, to health insurance choices.40 This is why young,
healthy people often forgo buying health insurance, even if it’s cheap.
Documenting the end result of all of these barriers, a volume of empirical work
illuminates the many ways and reasons that we—regardless of education, income, or smarts—
make poor choices among health plans. As described below, these poor choices persist when
there is a clear, superior option. These poor choices persist even when options are simplified.
And they persist even in the face of efforts to help people make better choices through
decisionmaking supports, or nudges. As one set of researchers behind several studies that
looked at how to help people make better decisions by simplifying health plan options or
helping consumers through options concluded: “[T]he main barrier to financially efficient
choice was not the number of options confronting employees, nor the transparency of their
presentation, but rather the … lack of basic understanding of health insurance.” 41
A few select examples from the many studies showing the extent that we struggle when
selecting a health plan can illuminate this problem. For example, one study simulated the
purchase of an ACA plan, using participants who passed a screening test for basic insurance
literacy.42 Even these more-literate-than-average respondents selected the best choice only
37

Wendy Nelson et al., Clinical Implications of Numeracy: Theory and Practice, 35 ANN. BEHAV. MED. 261
(2008) (providing an overview of research on health numeracy and the clinical implications for patients); Valerie F.
Reyna et al., How Numeracy Influences Risk Comprehension and Medical Decision Making, 135 PSYCH. BULL. 943,
945-46 (2009) (reviewing studies showing links between innumeracy and poor health decisions); Ellen Peters &
Irwin P. Levin, Dissecting the Risky-Choice Framing Effect: Numeracy as an Individual-Difference Factor in Weighing
Risky and Riskless Options, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 435 (2008) (showing that lower levels of numeracy led to
higher loss aversion). On health literacy, see, e.g., ZSOFIA PARRAGH & DEANNA OKRENT, HEALTH LITERACY AND HEALTH
INSURANCE LITERACY: DO CONSUMERS KNOW WHAT THEY ARE BUYING (2015), http://www.allhealthpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/01/Health-Literacy-Toolkit_163.pdf (describing health literacy and summarizing studies on
health and health insurance literacy).
38
Wendy Nelson et al., supra note 35, at 263.
39
See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806
(1980).
40
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47
ECONOMETRICA 263, 264 (1979) (showing then people tend to make choices inconsistent with their own expected
utility when dealing with risky options).
41
Saurabh Bhargava & George Loewenstein, Choosing a Health Insurance Plan: Complexity and
Consequences, 314 JAMA 2505, 2506 (2015).
42
Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Affordable? The Value of Choice
Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521.
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about half of the time, and Wharton business school participants got it wrong over one-quarter
of the time.43
Among enrollees in the University of Michigan’s employee health plan, over one-third of
workers selected a plan that was identical to another in every way except that it had a more
restricted provider network.44 No one would be better off enrolled in this plan. Importantly, this
kind of network size variation is exactly what might differentiate a private and public option on
a health insurance exchange. Another study of a large U.S. firm found that a majority of
employees chose a worse option and, as a result, they paid on average 24 percent more than
they should have on premiums.45 Lower-income employees were more likely to make a bad
choice.
Similar results occur in Medicare when beneficiaries choose among private prescription
drug plans. One study found that 73 percent of enrollees could have chosen a plan with lower
premiums with no risk of spending more on prescription drugs over the course of the year. 46
Another estimated that only about 10 percent of enrollees choose their least-expensive
option.47
On the ACA marketplaces, a significant share of people choose plans with the lowest
monthly premiums but that make them ineligible for cost-sharing reductions, which reduce
their deductibles and copayments when they use medical care. 48 People who select these plans
will likely spend more in the long run.
Others choose health plans that are not aligned with their own stated medical needs
and preferences.49 In a study simulating the purchase experience on ACA exchanges, only one43
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third of respondents chose the cost-minimizing plan, based on their own anticipated medical
care need.50 Forty-three percent over insured, on average overspending by 24% or $1324 on
premiums, and nearly a quarter underinsured.51 The authors of this study estimated that if all
people buying plans on the ACA exchanges had similar error rates as the study population, “the
result would be roughly $7.1 billion of excess spending each year, borne by a population with
low to moderate incomes.”52
This quick and only partial yet representative review of research on health plan
selection is simply meant to illustrate that if the public option were not an obvious best
alternative—and probably even if it were—people would not necessarily select it. If, in turn, the
public option failed to gain significant market share, it would not exert pressure on the private
insurers to offer better quality or lower-priced plans.
Thus, in the end of the day, the public option would co-exist with private plans. Yet, it
would not serve the other promise that Sitaraman and Alstott see in competitive public
options, that of ensuring guaranteed universal access at controlled prices.
That’s not to say that having an undifferentiated public option would have no benefit.
There are 37 percent of counties where only one private insurer participates, which results in
17 percent of enrollees having only one choice of insurer.53 In these regions, evidence suggests
health plans have higher premiums.54 In these areas, the mere presence of a public option
might hold down premiums and premium growth. Such benefits are laudable, but far short of
the transformative vision that the public option’s architects had for it.
Further, the marginal gains from a competitive public option would have come at a cost.
The public option would have further justified preserving the existing system and problems
with it. Injecting this option into the existing ACA exchanges would perpetuate, and perhaps
even validate, this structure that is causing fundamental problems of inequity and regulatory
bloat in health care.
C. The Problem of Market-Based Bureaucracy
This regulatory bloat is the beginning of the more structural problems with a
competitive health insurance public option. While the promise of markets is that they are
50
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nimble and less bureaucratic than direct regulation, market-based approaches to health
insurance have produced exactly the opposite: massive regulatory scaffolding to establish
choice infrastructure and ongoing technocratic tinkering to try to fix the market’s flaws and
poor decisionmaking. Elsewhere, I’ve called this reality health care’s market bureaucracy. 55
The ACA’s exchanges have cost billions of dollars and have demanded extensive
regulatory investments and, at the end of the day, only provide coverage to 10 million people,
less than 3 percent of the population.56 The federal government spent nearly 5 billion dollars on
state grants to establish exchanges and continues to spend 1-2 billion dollars annually to
operate healthcare.gov, the federally-funded exchange.57 The effort to overhaul healthcare.gov
after it failed to work on its initial launch cost $1.7B, compared in an initial budget of $93.7M. 58
States with their own exchanges must fund a large part of their ongoing operations.
California estimated it would spend $534 million, excluding federal grants, by the end of FY2017
on administration of Covered California with ongoing annual costs of over $350 million, funded
out of plan assessments.59 Even a smaller state like Vermont will spend about $50 million
annually to run its state exchange.60
Costs also include opportunity costs. The efforts needed to bolster and refine the
exchanges has consumed health insurance regulators—at both the state and the federal level.
They have commanded oversized technocratic analysis of exchanges and their successes and
shortcomings, with some of the most talented researchers and think tanks consumed by this
task.61
For example the Department of Health and Human Services proposed, revised, and
issued hundreds of pages of federal regulations to implement the exchanges. 62 From the
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passage of the ACA through the end of the Obama Administration, the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) promulgated 24 new rules and generated 64 guidance documents
with respect to the exchanges alone.63 An entirely new office, the Center for Consumer
Information and Insurance Oversight, was established within CMS in part to implement them. 64
In parallel, state regulators have been doing the same.
Even more, sociologically, this labored creation and preservation of a market-based
structure reinforces the idea that choice of health plan is sacred and should be a primary goal,
even if the choice of plan it enables offers little meaning or value. By becoming part of this
market bureaucracy, the public option would reinforce the value that is at its very core: choice
defined in a narrow, micro-economic sense. Ironically, as compared to public options in other
domains like swimming pools or shipping services that can improve access or quality, a public
health insurance option would perpetuate prioritizing choice as a value over high-quality,
universal, and affordable access. In some domains, as Sitaraman and Alstott assert, a
competitive public option might simultaneously advance values of equity and freedom or
autonomy, but when it comes to health insurance and when freedom is defined as market
choice, these two value are at odds.
IV.

A More Transformative Path and Three Models of Non-Competitive Public
Options for Health Care

Even though the ACA-style competitive public health insurance option is certain to
disappoint, public health insurance can co-exist with private health insurance in achieving
universal access to affordable health care. But the most productive ways they can co-exist are
not in a competitive model.
If we think of freedom in collective terms, it can be advanced if a public option enables
everyone access to health care that would improve life opportunities. With this framing, the
public option could fill in glaring holes in our current system, or it could be the key to more
fundamental reform, by replacing the heavy reliance on private health insurance for baseline
access.
This final section is a brief sketch of more productive ways to employ a public health
insurance “option.” Many of these ideas have long existed in policy discussions and have been
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amplified leading up to the 2020 election, as experts consider the best path forward to achieve
the dual goals of guaranteed access at controlled prices.
A. Baseline coverage
One way public health insurance and private health insurance can co-exist is with public
health insurance as a baseline plan to cover basic health needs. This approach is undoubtedly
the surest way to achieve Sitaraman and Alstott’s vision of what public options can uniquely
deliver: guaranteed access at a controlled price. A baseline plan is available to all. The
government sets payment rates for goods and services, working to keep spending as low as
possible while maintaining sufficient supply of providers.
Health care systems all around the world follow this model, in countries like Canada,
France or England. The details can take many forms. Benefits can be more or less extensive.
This, in turn, defines the nature of its relationship with private supplemental coverage that fills
in what is not covered. Medicare for All is one idea in this mold, and the details would
determine how the public and private coverage co-exist. A more comprehensive version, like
the model advanced by Senator Bernie Sanders is not a baseline model because it would leave
little role for private insurance, but a more politically realistic version would likely look more
like what other countries do.
Private insurance would thus serve the kinds of roles it does elsewhere—supplemental
coverage to fill in gaps if the public coverage does not pay for the full costs of care, or
complementary coverage to cover goods and services not publicly financed at all. For example,
in the existing Medicare program, original public Medicare is a baseline. It pays on average
about 60 percent of total health care costs of the enrolled population, and 90 percent of
Medicare enrollees have a secondary plan to fill in the gaps.65 Current enrollees use private
coverage in two ways. Some people buy a private supplemental plan, which they layer on top of
original Medicare. Others choose a private Medicare Advantage plan as a replacement for
traditional, fully public Medicare, and this privately-administered plan covers everything that
original Medicare would and fills in the gaps.66 Either way, a lion’s share of health care costs is
publicly financed, directly or in the form of payments to private Medicare Advantage insurers.
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A less transformative version of a baseline plan would be to offer a baseline to
everyone, but to allow certain people to opt-out, on a temporary or permanent basis. A more
permanent opt-out might allow people with incomes above a certain level to opt for private
coverage as their primary coverage, as in Germany. 67 But as Germany illustrates, this approach
can be thorny because it invites in inequity in access, where people who opt out might buy into
the better doctors, quicker access, and higher quality care.
Although a universal baseline approach would best serve the goal of health equity, it is
the hardest to achieve politically. Efforts at universal, public healthcare financing have been
proposed and defeated repeatedly in the U.S. over the past century.68 It may prove impossible
to create a hybrid system with public coverage as a baseline in a country where there is already
a strongly-embedded private system (although starting from scratch can be done, as Taiwan
demonstrated). Hybrid systems may work best in domains where the public option exists first
and the private ones fill in later, as in primary education or libraries. Yet, even then, there are
significant challenges to maintain a balance between the two when the boundaries of play
overlap or are not well demarcated.
B. Gap Filler
Another way to use public health insurance productively is as a gap filler for everyone
who does not have an alternative. For example, Medicare or Medicaid could be made available
to anyone who do not currently meet the criteria for these programs and who does not have
quality access to ESI or a subsidized private health insurance plan on an exchange.
A more ambitious version of this idea would be to subsume the ACA’s exchange
population as well. In the end, half of the population would have private coverage through ESI
and the other half would have public coverage of some flavor—Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, VHA,
and IHS. The public coverage would still vary by program, so it would lack any uniform policy
characteristic, but it would at least ensure that people did not fall through the cracks and the
government could attempt to control spending for at least half of the population. In this
version, public and private would co-exists population wide, with people sorted roughly into
one or the other. It would offer the flexibility Hacker discusses in Chapter __ and the potential,
even if small, for private insurance innovation. The greatest challenge would be to ensure that
the two paths remain equitable.
C. The Creeping Public Option
A compromise between a universal baseline and a gap-filler is to start with gap filling
and to expand over time. This was the initial vision that the architects of Medicare had in the
1960s—that it would first cover older Americans and would over time expand to cover the
67
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whole population.69 This vision is also what led opponents to universal, public coverage to
advocate for simultaneous passage of Medicaid.70 They bet (correctly) that once the elderly,
pregnant women, and children were covered, it would reduce motivation for addition
expansion of public insurance.
A creeping expansion, however, could still happen now. Candidates in the Democratic
primaries in 2019, including Kamala Harris and Elizabeth Warren, proposed creeping public
options. Legislation introduced by Representatives Rosa DeLauro and Jan Schakowsky, and
informed by Jacob Hacker (Ch ___), proposes to use Medicare first to fill in existing gaps. 71 It
also gives employers the option to enroll their employees in public coverage instead of offering
ESI. Over time, it envisions Medicare would grow in its reach by enrolling all newborns, which
over a generation would eventually create a universal baseline program, as described above,
and could take any of the forms of private and public coexistence described above.
Even if the creep stops short of universal, a public option that covers many Americans
could improve health equity and the health care system significantly. In fact, the larger and
more heterogenous of a population a public option reaches, the more durable it will be
politically and the more people will be invested in its success, as illustrated by high popular and
political support for Medicare.72
These kinds of proposals for creeping public options recognize the challenge of
transitioning from the current system to one where a public, baseline option serves a broader
social function and benefit. They also will face deep resistance from the same parties whose
livelihood will be threatened or transformed if public insurance expands—namely private
insurers and providers and suppliers whose reimbursement rates will be squeezed. They may,
in fact, be no more politically feasible than a direct step to Medicare for All and much more
bureaucratically complex, growing the market bureaucracy even more.
V.

Conclusion

A public option that is more than just a cog in a competitive marketplace—a piece of the
market-based bureaucracy—offers more potential to achieve greater equity and opportunity
for Americans. In fact, rolling out a public option as part of a neoliberal policy framework is
somewhat ironic. It seeks to serve particular end goals—ensuring high quality health care at
controllable prices—while also perpetuating a system that itself has been detrimental to
achieving these same goals.
That said, pushing the competitive feature aside, enables imagining possible futures
where public and private stand side-by-side or, more aptly, layered and work together to
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ensure equitable and affordable access to medical care that improves people’s life
opportunities. This imagining is not terribly hard. Countries all around the world manage to
make it happen in a variety of different models. But getting from our current models, and
mindsets, to these more equitable ends is no easy lift.
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